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In a recent survey by the Pew Center for Civic Journalism (2000), 18 percent of Americans said
urban sprawl and land development were the most important issue facing their local community
— the top response, tied with crime and violence. However, there was a key element of disagree-
ment. Respondents to this survey were almost evenly split (40 versus 52 percent) between those
wanting local government to limit further development to the inﬁlling of already built-up areas
and those wanting local government also to allow more scattered development in previously un-
developed areas. Despite this widespread interest, spatial development patterns are the dimension
of sprawl that we know the least about. We have some understanding of what determines urban
growth (see e.g. Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer, 1995, Overman and Ioannides, 2001, Black and
Henderson, 2003) and the decentralization of economic activity within cities (Glaeser and Kahn,
2004). However, we know almost nothing about the extent to which development is scattered or
compact, how this varies across space or what determines that variation. This paper is concerned
with this key aspect of sprawl.
Existingdatasetsarenotwell-suitedforstudyingthescatterednessofdevelopment. Toimprove
ourunderstandingweconstructanewdatasetbymerginghigh-altitudephotographsfromaround
1976 with satellite images from 1992. From these data, for units that are square cells of 3030
meters, we know whether land was developed or not around 1976 and in 1992, as well as details
about the type of developed or undeveloped land. Our data set consists of 8.7 billion such 3030
meter cells for a grid covering the entire conterminous United States.
Using these data, we provide basic facts about the extent of urban land development. Our
main focus, however, is on the spatial patterns of residential land development — in particular
whether residential development is sprawling or compact. This involves capturing the extent to
which residential development in urban areas is scattered across otherwise undeveloped land. In
sprawling areas, much of the land immediately surrounding the average house will not itself be
developed. Conversely, in areas where development is compact there will be a high proportion of
developed land in the immediate vicinity of the average house. To measure this, for each 3030
meter cell of residential development, we calculate the percentage of undeveloped land in the
immediate square kilometer. Averaging this measure across all developed cells in a metropolitan
area gives us an index of sprawl for the metropolitan area: the percentage of open space in the
square kilometer surrounding an average residential development. We calculate this index for all
metropolitan areas and then examine the reasons why sprawl differs across space.
Regarding overall development, we ﬁnd that only 1.9 percent of the United States was built-up
or paved by 1992. Two-thirds of this was already in urban use by 1976, while the remaining
one-third was developed subsequently. Turning to spatial patterns, only 0.3 percent of 1992
residential development is more than one kilometer away from other residential development.
On the other hand, at a ﬁner spatial scale, our measure of sprawl shows that 43 percent of the
square kilometer surrounding an average residential development is undeveloped. Thus, while
residential development almost never leapfrogs over large extensions of undeveloped land, it is
also not particularly compact on average. Moreover, contrary to widespread claims, the extent
1to which average residential development is scattered was essentially unchanged between 1976
and 1992. That is, while we have seen an increase in the amount of residential development, that
development was not any more biased towards sprawling areas in 1992 than in 1976. The same
is not true of commercial development: this appears to have become considerably more biased
towards sprawling areas in the time period under study. While spatial patterns of residential
development did not vary much between 1976 and 1992, our sprawl index indicates that there are
dramatic variations across metropolitan areas. Much of this paper is devoted to describing this
variation and to investigating the ability of the various theories of urban economics to explain it.
We start with the mono-centric city model and its generalizations. Consistent with these the-
ories, factors that increase the importance of the central business district decrease sprawl. Thus,
cities sprawl less if they specialize in sectors, such as business services, that tend to be centralized
in the average city. The commute to the city center also plays a role, with cities built around public
transportation more compact than cities built around the automobile. Patterns of past growth in
the metropolitan area also affect sprawl. Cities with higher historical population growth rates
sprawl less. Amongst other things, in fast growing cities small undeveloped plots do not stay
undeveloped for long. Greater historical uncertainty about growth also causes more sprawl as
developers withhold land to better adapt it to future needs.
We next consider physical geography. Despite technological progress, the physical environment
continues to play an important role in shaping cities. Sprawl increases substantially with the
presence of water-yielding aquifers in the urban fringe: such aquifers allow people to sink a well
and locate far from other development without bearing the large costs of extending municipal
water lines. Regarding physical barriers to development, high mountains close to development
constrain urban expansion and tend to make development more compact. Hills and small-scale
terrain irregularities, on the other hand, encourage scattered development. Finally, factors that
increase the value of open space, a temperate climate in particular, increase sprawl. In all, physical
geography alone explains about 25 percent of the cross-city variation in our sprawl measure.
We turn ﬁnally to political determinants of sprawl. There is more sprawl in cities where a
large proportion of undeveloped land lay outside of any municipality. In contrast, municipal
fragmentation has no effect, suggesting developers are often leapfrogging out of municipal zoning
and building regulations altogether, rather than playing municipalities against each other. Public
ﬁnance also plays an important role. There is more sprawl in places where larger intergovern-
mental transfers mean local residents bear less of the cost of extending infrastructure to service
new scattered development.
II. Data and Methodology
We construct our core data from two ﬁne-resolution data sets describing land cover and land
use (i.e., the physical features that cover the land and what those features are used for) across
the conterminous United States for the mid-1970s and the early 1990s. The most recent data set,
the 1992 National Land Cover Data (Vogelmann, Howard, Yang, Larson, Wylie, and Driel, 2001)
classiﬁes the land area in 1992 into different land cover categories mainly on the basis of Landsat
25 Thematic Mapper satellite imagery. The earlier data set, the Land Use and Land Cover Digital
Data (us Geological Survey, 1990, us Environmental Protection Agency, 1994), derives mainly from
high-altitude aerial photographs taken circa 1976.1
Despite the different technologies used to construct the two data sets, the processes are fun-
damentally similar. For the 1992 data, ﬁrst-pass boundaries of contiguous areas with similar
land cover are generated by grouping together contiguous cells with similar vectors of reﬂectance
values recorded by satellite imagery. Aerial photographs and ancillary data are then used to reﬁne
these boundaries and to assign land cover codes. For the 1976 data, the initial boundaries are
drawn directly on the basis of the aerial photographs and then these photographs and ancillary
data are used to assign land cover codes. While the 1970’s data have been available for over
a decade, the 1990s data only became available in 2001 and are the most current land use data
available for the nation. The data appendix describes in more detail the process followed by the us
Geological Survey (usgs) and the us Environmental Protection Agency (epa) to construct each of
the data sets, as well as the way in which we have completed and integrated them. Our resulting
data set has units of observation which are square cells of 3030 meters situated on a regular grid.
For each of the approximately 8.7 billion cells that make up the conterminous United States we
know the predominant land cover and land use circa 1976 and in 1992. Land is categorized as:
residential development; commercial and industrial development and transportation networks;
water; bare rock and sand; forest; range and grassland; agricultural land; or wetlands.
Figure i presents a map of the United States derived from our data. This map shows, in yellow,
the stock of land that was already built up circa 1976, and in red, new urban land built between
circa 1976 and 1992. Land that remained non-urban in 1992 appears grey with shaded relief, and
water is marked blue. This map reveals a number of noteworthy aggregate features. Perhaps
the most striking is that the United States is overwhelmingly unoccupied. In fact, our data show
that only 1.9 percent of the land area was either built up or paved by 1992. Two-thirds of this
developed land was already in urban use around 1976, one-third was developed subsequently.
Developed area grew at a very high rate (2.5 percent annually, 48 percent over 16 years), but new
development absorbed only a very small proportion of undeveloped land (0.6 percent over 16
years).2
Our estimate that only 1.9 percent of the United States was developed by 1992 is slightly lower
than previous estimates. Typically, these estimates use the partition of the territory into ‘urban’
and ‘rural’ made by the us Census Bureau for administrative purposes. In the 1990 census, 2.5
percent of the conterminous United States was classiﬁed as urban. Using this ﬁgure systemat-
ically overstates the extent of built-up land in population centers by counting the entire area as
developed when it need not be. At the same time it ignores development housing the one-quarter
of the population that was classiﬁed as rural in 1990. Some recent studies (e.g. Fulton, Pendall,
Nguyen, and Harrison, 2001) estimate built-up land using National Resource Inventory (nri) data,
1These photographs were collected over the period 1971–1982 but the most common date is 1976, which is also the
median year.
2Our data also allows us to look at the development rate of different types of undeveloped land. There is no large

































































































































































4assembled by the us Department of Agriculture on the basis of remote-sensing data for a relatively
small sample of us non-federal land. According to these data, 2.9 percent of the United States was
urban or built-up by 1992. The main reason why this estimate is larger than our ﬁgure is that,
in the nri data, the boundaries of urban and built-up areas are drawn in such a way that they
incorporate substantial amounts of undeveloped land. In particular, all undeveloped land located
between buildings or roads that are up to 500 feet (152 meters) apart is classiﬁed as built-up (us
Department of Agriculture, 1997) — contrast this with our 30-meter resolution. However, the
main advantage of our data is that it allows us to measure the scatteredness of development, the
key concern of this paper. In contrast neither census urban/rural boundaries nor the nri allow
this — in fact the nri is not available at the sub-state level since “[data at the county level] do not
meet nri reliability standards because of the small sample sizes for geographic units of that size”
(us Department of Agriculture, 2001, p. 21).3
While our data show that only 1.9 percent of all land was developed by 1992, this aggregate
number masks large differences across states. Data for individual states are reported in table i. The
ﬁrst two columns show the percentage of all land in each state that was urban by 1992 and by 1976.
The third column reports the percentage of 1976 non-urban land converted to urban between 1976
and 1992. The last three columns report the percentages accounted for by each state of us urban
land in 1992, of us land area, and of us 1976 non-urban land converted to urban between 1976
and 1992.4 One particularly interesting aspect of this heterogeneity is that coastal states both had
high initial percentages of urban land and also experienced relatively fast growth. More detailed
analysis shows that land within 80 kilometers of the ocean or Great Lakes accounts for only 13.4
percent of the total land area, but contained 45.6 percent of developed land in 1976. This share
declined slightly to 44.2 percent in 1992, but coastal areas still accounted for 41.3 percent of 1976–92
urban development. Interestingly, the evolution of the coastal concentration was quite different for
residential and commercial development. While the share of residential land within 80 kilometers
of the coasts increased from 46.6 percent to 48.5 percent, the share of commercial land fell from
43.2 percent to 34.3 percent. The shift of commercial development away from coast is consistent
with Holmes and Stevens (2004) ﬁndings on changes in the location of large us manufacturing
plants. This decline in the coastal concentration of commercial land together with the rise in that of
residential land can also be seen as supporting the argument made by Rappaport and Sachs (2003)
that amenity considerations are increasingly important relative to production considerations in
driving coastal concentration.
Zooming in, ﬁgures iia and iib depict development for four areas: Atlanta (top of ﬁgure
iia), Boston (bottom of ﬁgure iia), around San Francisco (top of ﬁgure iib), and around Miami
3A number of other papers use detailed geographical data similar to our own (e.g. Mieszkowski and Smith, 1991,
Rosenthal and Helsley, 1994, Geoghegan, Wainger, and Bockstael, 1997, Geoghegan, 2002, and Irwin and Bockstael,
2002), but each focus on a particular city or small area.
4We correct for photographs not taken in 1976 by ﬁrst determining the portions of each county photographed in any
given year, then estimating the percentage of urban land in each of these county portions by assuming a constant local
annual growth rate over the period, and ﬁnally aggregating up to the state and national levels.
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Alabama 1.39 1.02 0.37 1.24 1.71 1.01
Arizona 0.79 0.44 0.35 1.58 3.82 2.14
Arkansas 1.25 0.72 0.54 1.15 1.76 1.51
California 2.85 2.14 0.73 7.81 5.25 6.01
Colorado 0.89 0.49 0.40 1.62 3.50 2.25
Connecticut 16.30 9.89 7.12 1.38 0.16 1.67
Delaware 7.18 5.94 1.32 0.25 0.07 0.13
dc 68.13 67.21 2.80 0.07 0.00 0.00
Florida 8.93 4.45 4.68 8.52 1.83 13.10
Georgia 2.52 1.59 0.94 2.58 1.96 2.92
Idaho 0.39 0.19 0.20 0.57 2.80 0.89
Illinois 3.70 2.87 0.86 3.61 1.87 2.50
Indiana 3.38 2.60 0.80 2.14 1.21 1.52
Iowa 2.49 0.95 1.56 2.40 1.85 4.57
Kansas 0.98 0.67 0.31 1.41 2.76 1.37
Kentucky 1.84 1.33 0.52 1.29 1.35 1.11
Louisiana 2.62 1.80 0.84 1.99 1.46 1.92
Maine 1.41 0.96 0.45 0.76 1.04 0.74
Maryland 7.82 6.72 1.18 1.36 0.33 0.58
Massachusetts 17.34 12.35 5.70 2.42 0.27 2.13
Michigan 3.20 2.39 0.84 3.22 1.93 2.52
Minnesota 1.62 0.82 0.80 2.27 2.69 3.44
Mississippi 1.24 0.79 0.45 1.03 1.59 1.13
Missouri 1.95 1.24 0.72 2.38 2.33 2.65
Montana 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.55 4.92 0.90
Nebraska 0.60 0.41 0.20 0.82 2.61 0.82
Nevada 0.34 0.13 0.21 0.66 3.71 1.23
N. Hampshire 4.56 2.49 2.12 0.64 0.27 0.89
New Jersey 20.57 17.78 3.39 2.54 0.24 1.06
New Mexico 0.34 0.22 0.12 0.72 4.06 0.75
New York 5.48 4.59 0.93 4.50 1.57 2.24
N. Carolina 4.19 2.97 1.26 3.60 1.65 3.21
N. Dakota 0.46 0.16 0.30 0.56 2.34 1.12
Ohio 5.27 4.41 0.90 3.80 1.38 1.90
Oklahoma 1.51 1.10 0.41 1.83 2.33 1.53
Oregon 0.76 0.53 0.23 1.27 3.21 1.17
Pennsylvania 4.13 3.37 0.79 3.23 1.50 1.83
Rhode Island 17.99 14.11 4.52 0.34 0.04 0.23
S. Carolina 3.43 2.30 1.15 1.83 1.02 1.84
S. Dakota 0.37 0.16 0.22 0.50 2.56 0.90
Tennessee 2.76 1.99 0.78 2.09 1.45 1.79
Texas 1.83 1.10 0.73 8.44 8.85 10.28
Utah 0.54 0.34 0.20 0.73 2.58 0.82
Vermont 2.91 1.47 1.46 0.30 0.20 0.45
Virginia 3.48 2.77 0.73 2.43 1.34 1.52
Washington 2.23 1.44 0.79 2.62 2.25 2.82
West Virginia 1.32 0.97 0.35 0.56 0.81 0.45
Wisconsin 1.84 1.28 0.57 1.77 1.84 1.65
Wyoming 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.36 3.28 0.49
United States 1.92 1.29 0.63 100.00 100.00 100.00
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7FIGURE IIb 
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and Miami, fl (Bottom Panel)
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8FIGURE III 
Urban Land and Aquifers in San Antonio and Austin, tx (Top Panel),
and Urban Land and Incorporated Places in Saint Louis, mo (Bottom Panel)
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9(bottom of ﬁgure iib). As before, urban land circa 1976 is marked in yellow and 1976–1992 urban
development in red, but non-urban land is now split according to its 1992 cover. These maps
reveal some of the complex spatial details of the land development process. Atlanta, the epitome of
sprawl, experienced an extraordinary amount of development from the mid-1970s and both recent
and older development are very scattered. Boston had less recent development and contains a
much more compact old urban core. However, the suburban development that took place since
the mid-1970s is, by some measures, even more scattered than in Atlanta. Development in San
Francisco and neighboring metropolitan areas is much more compact than in either Atlanta or
Boston, although looking closely at the map one can see green speckles marking the presence
of parks within the yellow-colored old development. New development respected these urban
parks but remained contiguous to earlier development, as evidenced by the red on the fringe
of pre-1970s development. Miami, like most of Florida, experienced spectacular growth in the
amount of developed land but, unlike Atlanta, this recent development either inﬁlled portions of
undeveloped land within earlier development (notice there are fewer urban parks than in San
Francisco) or took place contiguously with previously built-up areas. Figure iii presents two
additional maps, depicting development in the area encompassing the Austin-San Marcos and San
Antonio metropolitan areas (top panel, ignore for now the location of aquifers discussed later), and
in the Saint Louis metropolitan area (bottom panel, drawn at a different scale to show details of
the location of development relative to municipal boundaries, also discussed below). In terms of
urban sprawl, these two areas are somewhere in between the scatteredness of Atlanta and Boston
and the compactness of San Francisco and Miami.
To summarize such differences in the extent to which development is scattered or compact, we
developameasureofsprawl. Theﬁrststepistoﬁndarelevantspatialscaleatwhichtoconductour
analysis. To this end, we start by checking how often residential development leapfrogs over more
than one kilometer of undeveloped land. It almost never does: only 0.3 percent of all residential
development was more than one kilometer away from other residential development in 1992. Even
for recent (1976–1992) development, the ﬁgure was only 0.5 percent.5 Thus, if large amounts of
development are scattered rather than compact, this is happening at spatial scales less than one
kilometer. This means we need to exploit the full spatial resolution of our data and look within the
immediate kilometer of development.
We proceed as follows. To measure the extent of sprawl, for each 30-meter cell of residential
development, we calculate the percentage of open space in the immediate square kilometer.6 We
then average across all residential development in each metropolitan area to compute an index of
sprawl. For instance, to calculate a sprawl index for the new development that took place between
1976 and 1992 in each metropolitan area, we identify 30-meter cells that were not developed in
1976 but were subject to residential development between 1976 and 1992, calculate the percentage
5This tiny amount of long-distance leapfrogging has, however, signiﬁcantly reduced peoples’ ability to ‘get away
from it all’. The percentage of us land more than 5 kilometers way from any residential development dropped from 58.1
percent in 1976 to 47 percent in 1992.
6For computational reasons, rather than looking at the square kilometer centered on each 30-meter cell, we construct
a grid made up of square blocks of 30-meter cells each measuring approximately one square kilometer (990990 meter
squares so that each one contains an integer number, 1,089, of our underlying 30-meter cells). The percentage of open
space is then calculated for the one-kilometer cell block in which each 30-meter cell is located.
10of land not developed by 1992 in the square kilometer containing each of these 30-meter cells, and
average across all such newly developed cells in the metropolitan area. We also perform similar
calculations to calculate a sprawl index for the stock of development in 1976 and in 1992. This
provides a very intuitive index of sprawl: the percentage of undeveloped land in the square kilometer
surrounding an average residential development.7
III. Sprawl Across the United States
We start by examining the spatial structure of urban development for the United States as a
whole. Figure iv plots the probability density function showing the distribution of residential
development across areas with different degrees of sprawl. Consider the distribution for 1976,
given by the solid line. The area under the line between any two values in the horizontal axis is the
probability that a randomly-picked 30-meter cell classiﬁed as residential development in 1976 lies
in a square kilometer where the percentage of land not developed in 1976 lies between those two
values. The ﬁgure shows that residential development was almost uniformly distributed across
areas where between one-third and all of the surrounding square kilometer was not developed,
but overall residential development was skewed towards more compact areas.
Figure v shows that this is not the case for new development that occurred between 1976 and
1992. The ﬁgure plots the probability density function for this new development across areas with
different degrees of sprawl at the end of the period.8 The ﬁgure shows that, in contrast to the stock
of residential development in 1976, the ﬂow of new residential development between 1976 and
1992 was biased towards sprawling areas. Thus, new development does tend to be scattered at
small spatial scales.
We suspect that it is some perception that the ﬂow of new development is more scattered than
the initial stock that often leads people to conclude that development is more sprawled than in
the past. However, looking back at ﬁgure iv we see that, for the dimension of sprawl that is
our focus, this is not the case. The dashed line showing the distribution of the stock of 1992
residential development across areas with different degrees of sprawl is almost identical to the
solid line for the 1976 stock. In fact, on average, 42 percent of the land in the square kilometer
surrounding residential development was open space circa 1976. Remarkably, this ﬁgure remained
almost unchanged at 43 percent in 1992. Thus, while a substantial amount of scattered residential
7One could imagine conﬁgurations of development for a particular square kilometer with a large percentage of open
space that we might not want to characterize as sprawl. However, in metropolitan areas these are rare enough that they
do not drive our sprawl index. In particular, since we average across all residential development rather than across all
land in the metropolitan area, a square kilometer that is average for the nation at 43 percent undeveloped is counted
620 times (57 percent of 1,089 cells) when averaging across the metropolitan area. On the other hand, a square kilometer
with just one isolated developed cell is only counted once. Thus the index is not driven by rare instances of isolated
houses but by the groups of houses with an intermediate mixture of developed and undeveloped land surrounding
them. For computational reasons, it is too difﬁcult to work with buffers of less than one kilometer around houses. We
have, however, tried other summary statistics, such as the percentage of undeveloped land in the square kilometer
surrounding the median (instead of the average) residential development, and found almost identical results.
8Note that is the amount of ﬁnal development near new development that distinguishes sprawling from compact
areas. The easiest way to see this is to consider a city that grows in a completely contiguous way. All new development
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Figure v
Probability function of
1976–92 us residential development
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Figure vi
Mean percentage of non-urban land turned
residential 1976–92 by initial percentage of
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1976 and 1992 us commercial land
across areas with different degrees of sprawl
development was built between 1976 and 1992, overall residential development did not become
any more biased towards such sprawling areas.
To reconcile these apparently conﬂicting tendencies, note that the distribution of the ﬁnal stock
of development across different degrees of sprawl is not the result of adding the distribution of the
ﬂow of new development to the distribution of the initial stock. The reason is that, by adding the
ﬂow of new development to the initial stock, the distribution of the initial stock becomes shifted
to the left as inﬁlling makes formerly sprawling areas more compact. Figure vi further illustrates
the importance of this inﬁlling of areas that were partially developed to start with. It plots the
averageintensityof1976–92residentialdevelopment(i.e., thepercentageofnon-urbanlandturned
residential) in areas with different percentages of open space in the immediate square kilometer in
1976. The ﬁgure shows that it is areas that were about half undeveloped in 1976 that were subject
to the most intense subsequent residential development.
Pulling all this together, what do we learn about recent residential development and common
perceptions of sprawl? It helps to consider how the environment might have changed near a
12hypothetical house located in a medium-density suburb. The open space in the immediate neigh-
borhood of this house will most likely have been partly inﬁlled. Areas initially more compact,
presumably closer to downtown, will have experienced less change. Undeveloped areas further
out may now be scattered with low density development. To the family living in this house, the
pattern of residential development around them is very different from the one they experienced
in the 1970s. However, if we zoom out and look at the city from a distance, we see little change,
at least in the proportions of sprawling and compact development: the new city is just like an
enlarged version of the old city.
Whileourfocusisonresidentialsprawl, itisofinteresttocomparethedistributionofresidential
land with that of commercial land. As it turns out, while the sort of places where Americans
live has not changed substantially, the places where they shop and work has. Figure vii is a
counterpart to ﬁgure iv giving the distribution of commercial land (including industrial land
and transportation networks) across areas with different percentages of developed land nearby.
Looking ﬁrst at the solid line, we see that the distribution for the stock of commercial land in 1976
is clearly bimodal. Commercial development in the 1970s was biased towards areas that were
either very compact or very sprawling. Presumably the very compact commercial development is
ofﬁce buildings located downtown, while the scattered development is factories and malls located
in the outskirts of town.
Turning to the dashed line in ﬁgure vii, we see that, unlike residential land, commercial land
has become more biased over time towards areas with little nearby development.9 This ﬁnding
is consistent with the view that the decentralization of housing in the United States had already
reacheditspeakbythemid-1970swhereasitisonlymorerecentlythatemployment, andespecially
manufacturing employment, has shifted from city centers to suburbia (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001,
Holmes and Stevens, 2004).
III.A. Sprawling and Compact Cities
Earlier in this section we showed that the distribution of us residential development across areas
with different degrees of sprawl remained almost unchanged between 1976 and 1992. Analogous
distributions for individual metropolitan areas also show small differences across time for most
areas but very large differences across areas at either point in time. We can summarize these
differences using our sprawl index, the percentage of undeveloped land in the square kilometer
surrounding an average residential development, which corresponds to the mean of these distri-
butions. For each msa with 1990 population greater than one million, table ii lists the sprawl index
calculated for ﬁnal (1992) and initial (1976) residential development.
9It is worth noting that the proportions of residential and commercial land in overall us urban land remained
unchanged between 1976 and 1992 at about 70 percent and 30 percent respectively. Hence, our ﬁndings do not reﬂect
changes in the relative magnitudes of residential and commercial development but rather changes in their locations. We
note that commercial land includes roads and industrial land, so this result may partly reﬂect new (or misdated) roads
in rural areas as well as newly-constructed factories and shopping malls. More detail on this issue is available in the
data appendix.
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Atlanta 55.57 57.77 Minneapolis-St. Paul 32.07 31.34
Boston 47.64 44.72 New Haven 39.11 38.68
Buffalo 39.92 37.87 New Orleans 32.29 33.92
Charlotte 52.73 51.12 New York 28.75 28.47
Chicago 31.76 31.21 Norfolk 40.82 44.07
Cincinnati 47.79 47.45 Orlando 40.02 39.39
Cleveland 36.84 36.24 Philadelphia 42.51 43.03
Columbus 41.20 41.59 Phoenix 27.54 34.94
Dallas 28.08 26.65 Pittsburgh 57.70 56.71
Denver 28.63 28.63 Portland 44.90 43.38
Detroit 33.28 30.47 Rochester 48.80 48.11
Greensboro 52.94 51.45 Sacramento 34.93 30.72
Hartford 41.34 42.23 Salt Lake City 31.90 32.88
Houston 38.15 38.93 San Antonio 32.77 29.58
Indianapolis 39.66 37.68 San Diego 45.63 45.40
Kansas City 35.32 34.33 San Francisco 30.48 29.81
Los Angeles 35.41 32.95 Seattle 46.97 45.03
Memphis 27.40 28.72 St. Louis 43.44 40.62
Miami 20.73 20.03 Tampa 36.01 34.84
Milwaukee 35.33 33.85 Washington-Baltimore 49.81 50.68
Notes: Eachsprawlindexmeasuresthepercentageofundevelopedlandinthesquarekilometersurroundinganaverage
residential development in each metropolitan area in the corresponding year (1992 or 1976). For instance, the sprawl
index for 1992 residential land is computed by calculating the percentage of land not developed by 1992 in the square
kilometer containing each 30-meter cell classiﬁed as residential land in 1992 and averaging this percentage across all
cells classiﬁed as residential land in 1992 in the metropolitan area.
A comparison of the ﬁgures provided in table ii with the maps presented in ﬁgures iia and
iib shows that the sprawl indices provide a good summary of development patterns. Overall
development in Boston is substantially less scattered than in Atlanta, reﬂecting its much more
compact old urban core (47.64 percent open space in the square kilometer around the average
residential development in Boston in 1992, compared with 55.57 percent in Atlanta). However,
the scatteredness of recent suburban development in Boston has made this metropolitan area
somewhat less compact on average than it used to be: the percentage of undeveloped land around
the average residential development increased from 44.72 to 47.64 between 1976 and 1992. De-
velopment in San Francisco is much more compact: only 30.48 percent of the square kilometer
around the average residential development in San Francisco was not itself developed in 1992.
Miami is even more compact than San Francisco, reﬂecting the greater presence of concrete and
asphalt as opposed to small parks in between residential buildings: there was a mere 20.73 percent
14Table iii












sprawl (scatteredness) index 1.000
median lot size 0.521 1.000
miles driven per person 0.271 0.187 1.000
% employment over 3 miles from CBD  0.070 0.011  0.073 1.000
Notes: The sprawl (scatteredness) index is the measure of sprawl used throughout this paper: the percentage of
undeveloped land in the square kilometer surrounding an average residential development in each metropolitan area
in 1992. Median lot size compiled from the metropolitan data contained in the American Housing Survey 1994–98.
Average number of miles driven per person calculated from the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (us
Federal Highway Administration, 1995). Share of employment located more than three miles away from the central
business district in 1996 from Glaeser and Kahn (2001).
undeveloped land in the square kilometer around the average residential development in Miami
in 1992.
Table ii shows that, even at the metropolitan area level, the extent of sprawl is very stable
over time. However, table ii also reveals the spatial heterogeneity of development patterns that is
suggested by ﬁgure i. The square kilometer around the average residential building in Atlanta or
Pittsburgh is nearly 60 percent open space. In Miami, this number is just over 20 percent. Before
we turn to explaining this extraordinary variation across metropolitan areas, it is worth having a
brief look at how our index compares with measures looking at alternative dimensions of sprawl.
III.B. Correlation with Other Measures of Sprawl
Given that, until now, data to directly measure the scatteredness of development have been
unavailable, median lot size has often been used as a proxy for metropolitan areas where this
is known. We would expect places with a large median lot size also to have relatively scattered
development as measured by our sprawl index, since residential developments built on larger lots
tend to have a higher ratio of open space to built-up area. However, our index also captures the
presence and size of undeveloped land in between built-up lots. Table iii shows the correlation
between our index for 1992 residential development and several other measures of sprawl for
metropolitan areas with more than one million inhabitants in 1990.10 The correlation between our
index for 1992 residential development and median lot size in 1994–98 is 0.52.
The scatteredness or compactness of residential development, while an important dimension of
sprawl, isnottheonlyone. “Sprawl”isalsousedtodescribecitieswherepeopleneedtodrivelarge
distances to conduct their daily lives, or cities where employment is very decentralized (Glaeser
and Kahn, 2004). People in more scattered metropolitan areas do tend to drive longer distances:
10For most smaller metropolitan areas data are not available for these alternative indices. Correlations reported in
table iii are for the largest 40 metropolitan areas listed in table ii (with the exception of median lot size which is based
on 38 out of 40). See the Data Appendix for further details.
15the correlation between our index and the average miles driven per person is 0.27. However, there
is almost no correlation between the extent to which residential development is scattered and that
to which employment is decentralized (measured by the share of employment located more than
three miles away from the central business district, as calculated by Glaeser and Kahn, 2001). This
low correlation between measures of employment decentralization and other measures of sprawl
is also noted by Glaeser and Kahn (2004).
These correlations are of interest for three reasons. First, because they highlight the complexity
of spatial patterns of development. Second, they indicate the importance of interpreting our results
appropriately. We determine the factors which lead to sprawl in the sense of scattered develop-
ment. There is no reason to think that these factors will also explain the other features of the spatial
patterns of development, such as how much people drive or the extent to which employment is
decentralized. Finally, the table points out the difﬁculty of interpreting composite sprawl indices
(e.g., Ewing, Pendall, and Chen, 2002). Given the low correlations between measures of different
aspects of sprawl, when these are combined into a single number it is hard to know what is
measured, let alone explain its determinants.
IV. Urban Economic Theory and the Causes of Sprawl
To investigate the determinants of sprawl, we turn to urban economic theory for guidance. Unfor-
tunately, there is no uniﬁed model that tells us what determines the extent to which development
is scattered or compact. Instead, the difﬁculties involved in working with general equilibrium
models where space is explicitly modelled have led urban economists to develop many special
models to tackle particular issues. A few of these models have been written speciﬁcally to study
some aspect of sprawl. Most of them have, however, been written with a different purpose in
mind, yet also have implications relevant for sprawl. In this section we survey this literature in
order to formulate hypotheses about the causes of sprawl.
IV.A. The Monocentric City Model and Its Generalizations
The most widely-used theoretical construct in urban economics is the monocentric city model,
which deals with the determinants of variations in the intensity of residential urban development.
This model derives from the pioneering contributions of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967), Muth (1969),
and Wheaton (1974) (see Brueckner, 1987, for an elegant synthesis). The monocentric city model
assumes that all employment in the city takes place at a single center, the central business district.
Residential development around that center is then shaped by the trade-off between convenient
commuting close to the center and affordable housing further away. Equal utility across residential
locations implies housing prices decline with distance to the city center to offset higher commuting
costs. Equal proﬁts for developers, who combine land and capital to produce housing, implies a
similar gradient for land prices. Substitution in response to declining land and housing prices
leads to larger dwellings with lower capital to land ratios (i.e., less tall, more spacious units and
larger yards) as one moves away from the center.
16The extent to which us metropolitan areas can be characterized as monocentric has declined
over time. The proportion of jobs located in central cities fell from about 75 percent in 1950 to
about 45 percent in 1990 (Mieszkowski and Mills, 1993), and metropolitan areas have become
increasinglypolycentric(Anas, Arnott, andSmall,1998). BeginningwiththecontributionsofFujita
and Ogawa (1982) and Imai (1982) and continuing more recently with Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg
(2002), a number of papers have extended the monocentric city model to endogenously derive
monocentric as well as polycentric urban structures. In these models, cities specializing in sectors
with stronger agglomeration economies, due to externalities in the transmission of information,
tend to be monocentric while those with weaker agglomeration economies are more likely to
be polycentric (see chapter 6 in Fujita and Thisse, 2002). In their study using zip-code employ-
ment data, Glaeser and Kahn (2001) show that the extent of employment decentralization does
indeed vary widely both across cities and across sectors. In addition, sectors such as business
services where communication is particularly important do tend to be more centralized. General
equilibrium models of systems of cities building on Henderson (1974, 1987) also show that cities
specializing in sectors with stronger agglomeration economies have more expensive land, which
offsets the higher wages resulting from agglomeration economies. Substitution away from land
then implies higher buildings with smaller units and yards, i.e., more compact development.
Thus, a crucial implication of the monocentric city model is that cities specializing in sectors where
employment tends to be more centralized will be more compact.
A second prediction arising from the monocentric city model is that lower transport costs within
a city will result in more dispersed development. A greater ability to use the car for commuting not
only reduces transport costs, but also eliminates the ﬁxed costs associated with public transport
(Glaeser and Kohlhase, 2004). Both these effects contribute to sprawl.
The standard monocentric city model thus predicts scattered development, due to large yards,
in cities specialized in sectors where employment is less centralized and where it is easier to
use a car. However, a key feature that the standard monocentric city model cannot explain is
leapfrog development where parcels of land are left undeveloped while others further away are
built up. Urban economists have followed two strategies to extend the monocentric city model
to account for equilibrium leapfrogging. The ﬁrst is to assign an amenity value to public open
space so that individuals may be willing to incur the additional commuting costs associated with
locating further away from the city center in order to have open space near their home. Scattered
development then takes the form of equilibrium leapfrogging, where remote areas are developed
before central areas and residential development is mixed with undeveloped parcels (Turner,
2005). Animmediateimplicationisthatcharacteristicsthatmakepublicopenspacemoreattractive
will increase sprawl. While the same is true about private open space, there is one important
regard in which public open space differs from private: the control that the residential owner has
over subsequent development. If moving is costly, the willingness to trade off commuting costs
against access to public open space will depend on expectations of how long that space will stay
undeveloped. In areas where population is growing fast, a rational agent anticipates that nearby
vacant land will be developed sooner, and thus is not willing to incur large additional commuting
costs to gain access to it. Thus, cities that have been growing faster will tend to experience less sprawl.
17The second strategy that urban economists have followed to account for equilibrium leapfrog-
gingistoconsiderdynamicurbanmodelswherehousingisdurableandredevelopmentcostly. The
core argument is that it may be optimal to postpone development of certain parcels so that in the
future they can be developed in a way that better suits contemporaneous needs (Ohls and Pines,
1975; Fujita, 1976; Mills, 1981; see Fujita, 1983, and Brueckner, 2000, for reviews). Uncertainty is
particularly interesting in this context. In a model with uncertainty, Capozza and Helsley (1990)
argue that developers should delay development until the value of the built-up land compensates
for, not just the value of land in the best alternate use plus conversion costs (as in Arnott and
Lewis, 1979), but also the option value of not developing in the face of uncertainty. Bar-Ilan and
Strange (1996) extend Capozza and Helsley (1990) to allow for the fact that there are often long lags
between the decision to build and the completion of construction. In this framework, uncertainty
about urban growth translates into greater rent uncertainty the further away a parcel is from the
city center. In the presence of construction lags, an increase in uncertainty can encourage some
landowners to choose earlier development. Thus, when leapfrogging occurs, leapfrogging is greater
the greater the uncertainty about future urban growth.
IV.B. When Space Is Not a Featureless Plain
Urban economists typically explain the clustering of people on the basis of agglomeration econom-
ies. Whiletherearemanymicroeconomicfoundationsforsucheconomies(seeDurantonandPuga,
2004, and Rosenthal and Strange, 2004, for reviews), perhaps the simplest is the existence of large
indivisible public facilities (Buchanan, 1965). One example of particular interest is municipal water
systems. What makes these shared water systems different from other public facilities is that in
certain locations there is an alternative individual provision not subject to the same indivisibilities.
Most households in the United States get their water through the nearest municipal or county
water supply. Extending water systems to service new scattered development in the urban fringe
requires substantial infrastructure investments, the cost of which is typically borne by developers
through connection fees and ultimately reﬂected in housing prices. For instance, to ﬁnance part of
the $127 million cost of a 20-mile pipeline to suburban development in Denver’s South Metro area,
the East Cherry Creek Valley Water and Sanitation District decided to charge $24,000 to connect
new homes11 — about one seventh of the contemporaneous median house value in the Denver
metropolitan area.
In places where water-yielding aquifers are pervasive, developers can sink a well instead of
connecting to the municipal or county water supply. 15 percent of households in the United
States get their water from private household wells (us Environmental Protection Agency, 1997).
According to the National Ground Water Association (wellowner.org), the average construction
cost of a private well is approximately $4,500. Private wells are rarely used in areas subject
to compact development partly because in these areas they are often unsafe, or disallowed, by
municipal regulations and partly because inﬁll development in compact areas is typically subject
to low water connection fees given the large number of connections per mile of pipe. However,
11“Suburbs plan $127 million water system”, Rocky Mountain News, 19 December 2003.
18low-cost private wells can facilitate scattered development in the urban fringe provided there is an
aquifer from which to pump out water.
The top panel of ﬁgure iii illustrates the relationship between aquifers and sprawl with a map
of San Antonio (located in the southwest of the map) and Austin (northeast), in Texas. Only part of
thesecitiesoverlaysanaquifer—theEdwards-Trinityaquifersystem—outlinedandcrosshatched
in white. Households southeast of the “bad water line” plotted as a white dotted line cannot safely
draw water from a well. The San Antonio Water System charges developers one-time connection
fees per dwelling unit that range from $500 in some central areas to $24,000 in an eastern suburb.
However, developers building in areas overlaying the aquifer can sink a well and avoid the water
connection fee or even build in areas where a connection to the municipal supply is not available.
The map shows that most new development in San Antonio since the mid 1970s (marked in red)
has taken place above the Edwards aquifer and that this development is much more scattered than
that which does not overlay the aquifer. Austin shows a similar pattern.
Urban models typically treat space as a featureless plain to better focus on economic mechan-
isms, particularly agglomeration economies. The presence of aquifers is a particularly interesting
dimension of underlying heterogeneity in the physical landscape precisely because of the way it
interacts with agglomeration economies: wherever aquifers underly the urban fringe, household water
can be obtained without the large increasing returns associated with public water systems and this facilitates
scattered development. We now turn to other features of the physical landscape that are likely to
matter for sprawl.
Nature can also contain sprawl through physical barriers hindering urban expansion. For
instance, the mountains bordering Los Angeles are often mentioned as the main barrier to further
expansion of its sprawling suburbs, and this has lead to the coining of the phrase “sprawl hits the
wall” (Southern California Studies Center and Brookings Institution, 2001).
In studying the effect on sprawl of mountains located in the urban fringe, we need to be
careful to separate large-scale from small-scale terrain irregularities. This is because one would
expect mountains and hills to have opposite effects. When an expanding city hits a mountain
range, further scattered development in the urban fringe becomes very costly. This encourages
inﬁlling and leads to increasingly compact residential patterns. On the other hand, small-scale
irregularities in the urban fringe presumably have the opposite effect. When terrain in the urban
fringe is rugged, steep hillsides where development is more costly alternate with ﬂat portions
where development is less costly. Thus, we would expect rugged terrain to naturally encourage scattered
development. In contrast, high mountains in the urban fringe are likely to make development more compact.
In our discussion of the monocentric city model and its extensions, we saw that characteristics
that make open space more attractive are likely to encourage both larger yards and more frequent
undeveloped parcels providing public open space. Thus, a third hypothesis related to the physical
landscape is that cities with a pleasant temperate climate experience more sprawl.
IV.C. Political Geography
In his excellent book on the economics of zoning, Fischel (1985) devotes substantial attention to the
political geography of zoning. There, he discusses a possible relationship between jurisdictional
19fragmentation and the restrictiveness of zoning: if a small number of municipalities dominate a
metro area, they may exploit their monopoly power on behalf of incumbent residents to restrict the
supply of land and increase property values. He concludes that such a relationship is unlikely to be
of practical importance for three reasons. First, large jurisdictions also tend to internalize the pros
as well as the cons of development (e.g., a large jurisdiction is more likely to house the construction
workers building new residences as well as the neighbors trying to stop these). Second, there
are few instances of areas with highly concentrated municipal structures in the United States.
Third, legal and practical restrictions limit the ability of even very dominant jurisdictions to act
as monopolists.
Rubinfeld (1978) and Katz and Rosen (1987), among others, stress differences between zoned
and unzonedareas instead of competitionbetween zoned areas ofdifferent sizes. These differences
are illustrated in ﬁgure iii. This map of municipal boundaries in Saint Louis (outlined in white)
is very similar to one included in Fischel’s (1985) analysis, except that we add land use data.
This reveals that the most striking feature is actually the different character of new development
on incorporated versus unincorporated land. A disproportionate share of 1976–92 development
happens in unincorporated areas that were close to existing development but just beyond the
municipal boundaries as they were circa 1980. This development is also more dispersed than
that on incorporated land. Many other metropolitan areas show a similar pattern. There is a
good reason for this: almost every zoning law includes the provision that whenever regulations
differ, the most restrictive rules apply. In unincorporated areas, only county and state planning
regulations generally apply, while incorporated places add their own zoning restrictions and
growth controls. To the extent that there are unincorporated areas on the urban fringe, developers can
escape municipal regulation by building outside municipal boundaries, and this facilitates sprawl.
Finally, in Tiebout’s (1956) model, zoning is the means by which communities can limit and
shape immigration and development to suit the cost structure of local public goods. If local public
services are more costly when development is scattered, then aversion to scattered development
should be less strong and sprawl should be more prevalent where local tax payers pay a smaller share of
local government expenses.
V. The Causes of Sprawl
Our review of the urban economics literature in the preceding section suggests that cities will
sprawl more if:
• they specialize in sectors where employment is not typically located close to the city center,
• they were built around the car rather than around public transport,
• they have experienced slow population growth,
• there is greater uncertainty regarding their future population growth,
• aquifers underlie a greater fraction of their urban fringe,
• they are not surrounded by high mountains,
• terrain in their urban fringe is rugged,
20• their climate is temperate,
• they begin with substantial unincorporated areas on the urban fringe,
• local tax payers pay a smaller share of local government expenses.
In this section, we test these predictions by regressing our sprawl index for new development in
individual metropolitan areas on initial metropolitan area characteristics. The dependent variable
in our regressions is therefore the percentage of undeveloped land in the square kilometer around
an average 1976–92 residential development in each metropolitan area (i.e., we identify 30-meter
cells that were not developed in 1976 but were subject to residential development between 1976
and1992, calculatethepercentageoflandnotdevelopedby1992inthesquarekilometercontaining
each of these 30-meter cells, and average across all such newly developed cells in the metropolitan
area). Figures for the 40 largest metropolitan areas are reported in the ﬁnal column of table ii,
although we will consider all us metropolitan areas in our regressions.
We focus on this dependent variable because concerns about new development drive most of
the public debate about sprawl. In addition, we wish to avoid the obvious endogeneity issues that
would arise if we instead used as dependent variable our sprawl index for the 1976 or 1992 stocks
of development. However, as we show later, results using the sprawl index for the stock of 1992
development are very similar.
The spatial units of observation are individual metropolitan areas (although, obviously our
calculations of the sprawl index and various explanatory variables still need to use the full spatial
resolution of our data). We use the Metropolitan Statistical Area and Consolidated Metropol-
itan Statistical Area deﬁnitions (New England County Metropolitan Area deﬁnitions for New
England). Since these are county-based deﬁnitions, care is needed when measuring the initial
characteristics of areas where new development might take place. This is particularly important
in the western part of the country, where counties are sometimes very large and consequently
metropolitan area boundaries are often drawn much less tightly around the developed portion of
metropolitan areas than in the east. We therefore restrict calculations for geographical variables to
the “urban fringe”, deﬁned as those parts of the metropolitan area that were mostly undeveloped
in 1976 but are located within 20 kilometers of areas that were mostly developed in 1976.12 Given
that we isolate the urban fringe in this manner, it makes sense to start with fairly wide metropolitan
area boundaries before we cut out areas far away from initial development. We therefore use
1999 deﬁnitions (us Bureau of the Census, 2000). We include all 275 metropolitan areas in the
conterminous United States in our regressions.
12Mostly developed areas are those where over 50 percent of the immediate square kilometer was developed in 1976.
The choice of 20 kilometers as a threshold was guided by visual inspection of maps showing the evolution of land use in
all metropolitan areas. A buffer of 20 kilometers around areas that were already mostly developed in 1976 includes 98






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































22Results are reported in table iv.13 Column (1) reports our main speciﬁcation. Column (2) and
(3) report results including additional variables and controls. Finally column (4) repeats our main
speciﬁcation using the sprawl index for 1992 development rather than for 1976–1992 development
as the dependent variable. To aid comparison across variables, we report standardized coefﬁcients
that measure the absolute change in the sprawl index for a one standard deviation change in each
independent variable.
V.A. The Monocentric City Model and Its Generalizations
We begin by examining the link between employment centralization and sprawl. Examining the
link directly using a measure of the extent to which employment is centralized in each metro-
politan area is clearly problematic: ceteris paribus, more compact cities will have more centralized
employment. To avoid this endogeneity problem we instead measure the extent to which the city is
specialized in sectors, such as business services, that in the average city tend to be very centralized.
To be precise, our measure is the share of employment that would be located within three miles of
the central business district if employment in each sector in that metropolitan area was distributed
relative to the center as it is in the average metropolitan area. See the Data Appendix for further
details on how this variable is calculated. Results are reported in column (1) of table iv. A one
standard deviation increase in centralized-sector employment decreases the sprawl index by 1.270
points. We see that, consistent with the monocentric city model, cities are more compact if they
specialize in sectors that tend to be more centralized in the average metropolitan area.
Peoples’ choice of residence might be driven by their leisure activities as well as by their em-
ployment. If employment centralization tends to limit the amount of sprawl, perhaps centralized
amenities could play a similar role? To examine this possibility, we tried including various con-
sumer amenity variables used in Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001), such as live performance venues
per capita or restaurants and bars per capita. Results reported in column (2), which includes
restaurants and bars per capita, are typical: amenities have no impact and yet including them
does not change our results. This is reasonably intuitive. Restaurants and bars are not actually any
more centralized than household appliance stores (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001). Performance venues
are, but the frequency with which most people go to these is such that their availability might affect
the choice of metropolitan area (as suggested by the results on population growth in Glaeser et al.,
2001) but not so much the choice of whether to live in a compact or a scattered neighborhood.
We now turn to our prediction that car-friendly cities sprawl more. Naturally, cities developed
mostly after the advent of the automobile tend to be much more car-friendly than cities built before
1900 around public transit. We use the number of streetcar passengers per capita in 1902 (from
Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999) as a proxy for a historical city center less friendly to car usage.
13Our sprawl index is bounded between 0 and 100, so one may worry about the validity of ols estimation. However,
the minimum (33.35) and maximum (88.47) values occurring in the data are sufﬁciently far from the boundary to suggest
that this is unlikely to cause problems in practice. This is also reﬂected in the fact that the minimum (36.01) and
maximum (79.05) predicted values lie comfortably within the boundaries. Finally, note that converting to a (0,1) index
and running the regression using a logistical transformation only results in some marginal changes to the signiﬁcance
of the results but makes coefﬁcients much harder to interpret.
23Table iv shows that a one standard deviation increase in 1902 streetcar usage decreases the sprawl
index by 1.723 points.
In addition to the role played by the historical city center, the car-friendliness of a city may also
depend on the road density in the urban fringe. Column (2) shows that such a measure (major
road density in the urban fringe, calculated from usgs 1980 digital line graphs) has no impact on
sprawl, and including it does not change the coefﬁcient on streetcar passengers or other variables.
Note that, while more roads may facilitate scattered development, scattered development leads to
alessdenseroadnetwork. Ourresultssuggestthatneitherofthesecounteractingeffectsdominates
in the cross section. Using roads early in the study period does not solve this problem since, as
we saw earlier, cities with more compact new development tended to also have more compact
development in the past.
The third of our predictions concerns the impact of expected population growth on sprawl. In
areas where population is growing fast, a rational agent anticipates that nearby vacant land will
be developed sooner, and consequently is not willing to incur large additional commuting costs to
gain access to this open space. Developers may expect that cities that have been growing relatively
fast in the past will continue to do so in the near future. We therefore proxy expected future
population growth using the metropolitan area’s historical mean decennial percentage population
growth for the ﬁve decades 1920–1970.14 Historical population growth rates are indeed a good
predictor of population growth between the 1970s and 1990s: the correlation between percentage
population growth 1970–1990 and mean decennial percentage population growth 1920–1970 is
0.60. Results in table iv show that areas that have historically seen high population growth rates
do, indeed, see less sprawl. A one standard deviation increase in the historical mean growth rate
reduces the sprawl index by 6.072 points.
We interpret this result as telling us something about the value of open space. However, given
thathistoricalpopulationgrowthratesareagoodpredictorofcurrentpopulationgrowthrates, this
result would also be consistent with fast growing cities using all available land to accommodate
their growing population. However, when we add actual 1970–92 population growth (clearly
endogenous, and only introduced as a robustness check) in column (2), we see that this does not
explain our results. Faster contemporaneous population growth does make cities more compact,
but historical population growth rates continue to have much the same impact on sprawl.
To test our fourth prediction that greater uncertainty regarding future city growth fosters
sprawl, we similarly assume that developers consider future local population growth more un-
certain in cities that have had more ups and downs in population growth rates over previous
decades. Speciﬁcally, our measure of uncertainty is the standard deviation of decennial percentage
population growth rates 1920–1970 (using the same population time series as above). The results in
table iv show that, as expected, higher uncertainty leads to more sprawl. A one standard deviation
increase in the standard deviation of decennial population growth rates increases the sprawl index
by 3.169 points.
14Constructing a historical series of population data for us metropolitan areas on the basis of county population
counts in each decennial census requires tracking changes in county boundaries over time. We did this using a revised
version of the County Longitudinal Template of Horan and Hargis (1995) kindly provided to us by Vernon Henderson
and Jordan Rappaport.
24V.B. When Space Is Not a Featureless Plain
We now turn to consider the impact of a range of geographical variables. We begin with the
prediction that aquifers facilitate sprawl, by allowing developers to sink a well and avoid the high
water connection fees often incurred by scattered development. Results presented in table iv show
that this is indeed the case. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of the urban fringe
overlaying aquifers (see the Data Appendix for details on this variable) increases the sprawl index
by 1.222 points.
We think this result is particularly interesting. Urban economists have long highlighted the
importance of indivisible public facilities for agglomeration. However, it is difﬁcult to cleanly
identify a role for indivisible public facilities in determining the extent to which development is
clustered. Two particular features of water systems help us make a clean identiﬁcation. First, we
can detect their impact in the cross section because certain places (those with aquifers) have an
alternative private provision that is not subject to the same indivisibilities. Second, the availability
of this alternative provision through aquifers is certainly exogenous. This has some interesting
policy implications that we consider in the conclusions.
What about terrain? We predict two effects from natural barriers and terrain ruggedness that
should work in opposite directions. Coming up with a measure of the presence of mountains
in the urban fringe is straightforward. For instance, we can calculate the range in elevation (i.e.,
the difference between the minimum and the maximum elevation) in the urban fringe. Meas-
uring small-scale terrain irregularities, however, is more difﬁcult because it requires much more
geographically detailed elevation data. Given that readily-available elevation grids covering the
conterminous United States do not have the required spatial resolution, we have assembled a
national elevation grid providing the elevation in meters of points 90 meters apart (see the Data
Appendix for more detail). Using these data, we calculate the terrain ruggedness index originally
devised by Riley, DeGloria, and Elliot (1999) to quantify topographic heterogeneity that can act
either as concealment for prey or stalking cover for predators in wildlife habitats. This terrain
ruggedness index, calculated on the 90-meter elevation grid, gives us a summary statistic of differ-
ences in meters of elevation between points 90-meters apart. This captures small-scale topographic
heterogeneity using a local counterpart to the global elevation range that we use to capture the
presence of mountains.
Turning again to our regression results in table iv, we see that both mountains and hills have
the expected effects. A one standard deviation increase in the elevation range in the urban fringe
decreases the sprawl index by 1.609 points. In contrast, more rugged terrain is associated with
more sprawl. A one standard deviation increase in the terrain ruggedness index increases the
sprawl index by 1.252 points.
There are other barriers to urban expansion that could in principle have a similar effect to
that of mountains: in particular, proximity to wetlands, public land or oceans. We have tried
numerous measures of all of these in our regressions and none of them matter empirically. In
the case of wetlands and public lands, this is not too surprising. Wetland mitigation banking
programmesallowdeveloperstobuildonwetlandareasinexchangeforﬁnancingthepreservation
or restoration of wetlands elsewhere. For public land, the Homestead Act of 1862 allowed settlers
25to easily acquire private ownership of public land. As a result, public lands are concentrated in
those parts of the nation that have historically been least attractive for setting up a residence. The
lack of impact of proximity to the Atlantic and Paciﬁc Oceans, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great
Lakes is more surprising. We have tried hard to ﬁnd evidence that proximity to these large water
bodies reduces sprawl and found none. We conjecture that this is partly because oceans act both
as a barrier and as an outdoor amenity: one cannot build on the ocean but proximity to the ocean
makes open space more enjoyable. Furthermore, as illustrated by the map of Boston in the bottom
panel of ﬁgure iia, a city can be bounded by the ocean on one side and still sprawl profusely on
the other.
Our ﬁnal prediction regarding the role of geographical variables is that characteristics that make
open space less attractive should reduce sprawl. The two most obvious characteristics are whether
the city has an extremely hot or cold climate. A standard measure of extreme heat is cooling degree
days, a concept used by engineers to calculate the demand for air conditioning. Extreme cold can
be similarly measured through heating degree days, used to calculate fuel demand for heating. We
use mean annual cooling and heating degree days calculated from climatic normals for the period
1961–1990 (again, see the Data Appendix for more details). The results in table iv show that both
variables have the predicted effect. A one standard deviation increase in mean cooling degree days
reduces the sprawl index by 6.512 points. while a one standard deviation in mean heating days
reduces the sprawl index by 4.986 points.
We have also checked whether other climatic variables, such as average precipitation, have an
impact on sprawl and found no evidence that they do. Finally, we have examined whether sprawl
is affected by other characteristics that may change the attractiveness of open space. Variables
capturing the percentage of forest or various types of vegetation in the urban fringe have no
signiﬁcant effects. This is in accordance with the literature on the amenity value of vegetation,
which ﬁnds very mixed results (see Irwin, 2002).
V.C. Political Geography
We turn, ﬁnally, to the role that political geography plays in driving sprawl. Estimation results
conﬁrm Fischel’s assertion that the relationship between jurisdictional fragmentation and the
restrictiveness of zoning is unlikely to be of empirical importance. Using a digital representation
of the municipal boundaries in effect at the time of the 1980 census (GeoLytics, 2000), we have
computed various measures of municipal dominance (the ratio of the size of the largest municip-
ality in each metropolitan area to the combined area of other municipalities, a Herﬁndahl index of
municipality sizes, and the inverse of the number of municipalities). Results reported in column
(2) for the Herﬁndahl index are typical: none of these measures have a statistically signiﬁcant
relationship with sprawl when added to our speciﬁcation.
While competition between zoned areas of different sizes does not appear to matter for sprawl,
thedifferencesbetweenzonedandunzonedareasstressedbyRubinfeld(1978)andKatzandRosen
(1987) do. To study the extent to which sprawl is encouraged by unincorporated areas on the
urban fringe, that allow developers to escape municipal regulation, we calculate the percentage of
the urban fringe incorporated in 1980. Results in column (1) of table iv show that a one standard
26deviation increase in the percentage of the urban fringe incorporated reduces the sprawl index by
1.363points. Inall, theseresultssuggesttousthatthefailureofmunicipalandcountygovernments
to harmonize land use regulation is an important contributor to sprawl. Developers, it seems,
are often leapfrogging out of municipal regulations altogether rather than playing municipalities
against each other.
To examine our ﬁnal prediction that sprawl increases when local taxpayers bear less of the
cost of providing public services to scattered development on the urban fringe, we include the
percentage of local government revenue that were transfer payments from other levels of govern-
ment in 1967 (us Bureau of the Census, 1974). Table iv shows that this variable has the expected
positive effect on sprawl: a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of intergovernmental
transfers in local revenues in 1967 increases the sprawl index by 1.075 points.
V.D. Physical Geography and Urban Sprawl
Our paper is unusual in its emphasis on the role that physical geography plays in explaining
sprawl. In fact, a regression including only our ﬁve geographical variables (capturing the role
of aquifers, terrain and climate) explains 23.5 percent of the variation in our sprawl index. As one
might expect, several of these variables vary in a quite predictable manner as one moves across
the country. To check the extent to which these variables may just capture spatial gradients in
the degree of sprawl, column (3) of table iv reports results when we include the latitude and
longitude of the centroid of each metropolitan area as well as ﬁxed effects for 9 census regions.
Three geographical variables (the two terrain variables and mean heating degree days) are no
longer signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Remarkably, our aquifers variable and cooling degree
days remain signiﬁcant. In addition, the impact of all variables not measuring physical geography
are essentially unchanged, with the exception of specialization in centralized sectors.
It is worth noting that, while our paper focuses on the causes of sprawl, there is also some
public interest in the consequences of sprawl. Studying such consequences empirically will require
good instruments, and our physical geography variables seem natural candidates. We also note
that our results are robust to a variety of other changes to the speciﬁcation in addition to those
discussed throughout this section. Our regressions include all us metropolitan areas regardless of
their size. If we include the initial population of each metropolitan area in our speciﬁcation, this
variable is not signiﬁcant and the rest of our results are not affected. Similarly, the inclusion of
other insigniﬁcant variables, such as various measures of demographic structure, segregation, or
historical voting patterns, do not change the robustness of any of the results we report here.
V.E. Stocks Versus Flows of Development
We have seen in section iii that there is very high persistence in the extent to which individual
metropolitan areas are either sprawling or compact. In fact, the correlation between the sprawl
indicesforthe1976and1992stocksofdevelopmentis0.96. Wemightthereforeexpectthevariables
that explain how sprawling are the ﬂows of new development to also explain the cross sectional
variation in how sprawling is the stock of ﬁnal (1992) or initial (1976) residential development.
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have exactly the same impact on the extent to which ﬁnal development in the metropolitan area is
sprawled. Results (not reported) are very similar for initial development and also do not change
when explanatory variables calculated for the urban fringe are instead calculated for the entire
metropolitan area.
VI. Conclusions
As with many economic and social processes, a true understanding of the implications of urban
sprawl can only come about through the study of both the positive and normative aspects of
the urban development process. Much of the current debate has seen people rushing to address
normative issues without ﬁrst having a good understanding of the positive aspects. In contrast, in
providing the ﬁrst detailed description of the process of urban development and its determinants,
our paper is quite clearly focused on improving our understanding of these positive aspects.
To summarize, 1.9 percent of the land area of the United States was developed by 1992. Two-
thirds of this developed land was already in urban use around 1976, while the remaining one-
third was developed subsequently. Our main ﬁndings are concerned with whether development
is sprawling or compact. We measure sprawl as the amount of undeveloped land surrounding
an average urban dwelling. By this measure, commercial development has become somewhat
more sprawling during the study period but the extent of residential sprawl has remained roughly
unchanged between 1976 and 1992. In contrast to this stability over time, the extent of sprawl does
vary dramatically across metropolitan areas.
We study the factors that determine these large differences across metropolitan areas. We ﬁnd
that sprawl is positively associated with the degree to which employment is dispersed; the reliance
of a city on the automobile over public transport; fast population growth; the value of holding on
to undeveloped plots of land; the ease of drilling a well; rugged terrains and no high mountains;
temperate climate; the percentage of land in the urban fringe not subject to municipal planning
regulations; and low impact of public service ﬁnancing on local taxpayers.
We are some way from being able to make ﬁrm policy recommendations, but our results do
raise some interesting questions for policy in this area. Perhaps the most intriguing issue arises
from the connection between aquifers and sprawl. Often the same aquifer will supply water
both to municipal water systems and to individual private wells. Private incentives may push for
scattered development over the aquifer, where one can sink a well and avoid connection fees to the
municipal supply. However, such development may be costly for others, since concrete, asphalt,
and other non-permeable materials hinder the replenishment of the aquifer with rain water. In
such a context, raising impact fees may only worsen the problem. This raises the intriguing
possibility that groundwater regulation may provide an important avenue through which policy
makerscaninﬂuencetheformofurbandevelopment. Anotherinterestingpolicyimplicationarises
from the fact that disparities between municipal and county regulation are important causes of
sprawl. Focus, so far, has been on the fragmented nature of local government, but our results
suggest that harmonization of county and municipal land use regulation may actually play a much
28more important role in inﬂuencing the form of urban development. Interestingly, while we ﬁnd
that sprawl is affected by two factors which have received little attention, another (the density of
roads) that has received much more attention seems to have little impact. While more car-friendly
cities do experience more sprawl, we ﬁnd that what really matters is not the density of the road
network on the urban fringe but instead whether the city center was shaped before the advent of
the car. Finally, our results on the transfer share in local revenues suggest that internalizing the
ﬁscal externalities of new development appears to limit urban sprawl.
Of course, these comments are fairly speculative given the current state of our knowledge.
Further analysis of economic models of development, and of models which incorporate a taste
for landscape features is warranted, and such analysis should form the basis for future policy
recommendations.
Data Appendix
A. Land Use/Land Cover Data
We construct our core data from two remote-sensing data sets. The most recent, the 1992 National
Land Cover Data (Vogelmann et al., 2001) are derived mainly from leaves-off (spring/fall) and
leaves-on (summer) 1992 Landsat 5 Thematic Mapper satellite imagery. The Earth Resources
Observation Systems (eros) data center of the United States Geological Survey (usgs) converted
the raw satellite images to land cover categories. Here we give a brief overview of the process, de-
scribed in detail in Vogelmann, Sohl, Campbell, and Shaw (1998a), Vogelmann, Sohl, and Howard
(1998b), and Vogelmann et al. (2001).
The Thematic Mapper sensor on the Landsat 5 satellite records data for units that are square
pixels of 3030 meters on a regular grid. We refer to these units as 30-meter cells. The sensor
detects electromagnetic radiation reﬂecting from the earth’s surface in seven wavelength bands
(four of which are used to construct the data). Combining reﬂectance information from different
bands for each 30-meter cell allows a very precise distinction between land cover features because
different types of land cover reﬂect different amounts of radiation at different wavelengths. For
instance, healthy vegetation reﬂects infra-red light to remain cool and wet but absorbs visible light
for photo-synthesis.
Land cover was classiﬁed as follows. First, a computer algorithm was used to ﬁnd clusters of
contiguous 30-meter cells with a similar set of reﬂectance values over the electromagnetic spec-
trum. Next, analysts used high-altitude aerial photographs and other census and remote sensing
data to match these clusters to land cover classes, to reﬁne the boundaries of these clusters, and to
make ﬁner distinctions between land cover classes. Since a single cell may contain multiple land
cover types, categorization is based on thresholds. For instance, for a cell to be assigned an urban
code at least 30 percent of it must be covered with constructed materials. Using this approach,
each 30-meter cell was categorized into one of 21 land cover classes.
Like the 1990’s data, the 1970’s (us Geological Survey, 1990, us Environmental Protection
Agency, 1994) classify the conterminous us land area into land use/land cover categories. How-
ever, rather than satellite imagery, the 1970’s data derive mainly from high-altitude aerial photo-
29graphs collected between 1971–1982. The most common date is 1976, which is also the median
year. The conversion to land use/land cover data was done by the usgs. The us Environmental
Protection Agency (epa) further processed the data to facilitate use in geographic information
systems and we use their version(us Environmental Protection Agency, 1994). We ﬁlled gaps in
these data to construct the ﬁrst complete coverage for the conterminous United States.15
To construct the 1976 data, analysts studied the photographs and, with the help of ancillary
data, traced the boundaries of contiguous areas with similar land cover and assigned one of 37
land cover codes. The rules for drawing these boundaries mean that areas may differ in size and
that a single area may contain multiple land cover types. Thus, as before, categorization is based
on thresholds. For instance, to be assigned an urban code an area must have at least 20 percent
urban cover within 4 hectares (10 acres). The resulting data contains the digitized boundaries of
these hand-drawn areas (irregular polygons) and a code describing the preponderant land cover
for each of them. us Geological Survey (1990) gives a more detailed description of this process.
While the 1976 and 1992 data are roughly comparable, there are a few differences with implica-
tions for our analysis. First the 1992 data are stored in raster format (assigning a code to each cell
on a regular grid) while the 1976 data are stored in vector format (assigning a code and providing
coordinates for irregular polygons). They also have different geographical projections. Thus, we
converted the 1976 data to the same projection and data model as the 1992 data, by breaking up
each polygon into the 30-meter cells it contains. This yields a data set giving the preponderant
land cover/land use of each 30-meter cell in a regular grid covering the entire conterminous
United States circa 1976 and in 1992. The second difference is that the data are categorized using
classiﬁcations with different degrees of detail. For this reason we work with two urban codes that
can be deﬁned in both years: residential; and commercial, industrial and transportation networks.
The third and most important difference arises from the fact that the 1976 data are slightly
less precise than the 1992 data when identifying small features different from their surroundings.
Given this, rather than compare the data directly, we use the 1976 data to separate urban land in
1992 into new and old development. Thus, we deﬁne old development as land that was classiﬁed
as urban in both 1992 and 1976. We deﬁne new development as land that was classiﬁed as urban
in 1992, but was not urban in 1976. This procedure largely corrects for the difference, but has the
drawbackthatwecannotcapturedevelopedlandthatisconvertedtofarmland, etc. However, such
un-development is rare: calculations by the Department of Agriculture suggest that less than 0.8
percent of developed land was un-developed over the 15-year period 1982–1997 (us Department
of Agriculture, 2000).
15The digital version of the land use and land cover data from 1:250,000-scale maps produced by the usgs lacks data
for a thirty by sixty minute rectangle in the map for Albuquerque and in the map for Cedar City and for a one degree
by one degree square in the map for Tampa. For Albuquerque and Cedar City, the usgs had digitized data from the
1:100,000-scale maps corresponding to the rectangles with missing data (Chaco Mesa in the case of Albuquerque, and
Kanab in the case of Cedar City). We processed these data with the same computer code used by the epa for the rest of
the nation to completely ﬁll the gaps. For Tampa, the missing data were not available digitally but could be found in the
corresponding 1:250,000-scale paper map distributed by the usgs. We digitized this to the same format speciﬁcations as
the rest of the epa data. Using the usgs paper and digital distributions of the data and two alternative sources for the
epa distribution, we were also able to correct various instances in which land use codes had become corrupted during
processing stages that occurred before we received the data. The data used to ﬁll the three holes in the usgs data are
available from http://diegopuga.org/data/sprawl/.
30One possible source of mismeasurement remains: we may date some development incorrectly,
if it is small enough relative to the resolution of our data and different from its surroundings in
at least one of the two periods. We cannot provide a precise upper bound on the magnitude of
this misdating. However, careful inspection suggests that only one result might be sensitive to
this: when we ﬁnd that commercial development became more biased towards scattered areas,
this result is ampliﬁed by the fact that land classiﬁed as commercial/industrial/transportation in
1992 occasionally includes small rural roads that were too small to register with the 1976 data.
B. Data for Alternative Sprawl Measures
Median lot size was compiled from the metropolitan data contained in the American Housing
Survey (us Bureau of the Census, 1994–98). The metropolitan data in the American Housing
Survey covers 47 metropolitan areas, where a sample of householders are interviewed about every
6 years. Each year, data for a few metropolitan areas is gathered on a rotating basis until all 47
areas included are surveyed. The cycle then begins again. The American Housing Survey does
not survey three metropolitan areas with populations over one million (Greensboro, New Haven,
and Orlando, although in the case of Greensboro median lot size in 1995 is available from the City
of Greensboro Planning Department, 2003. Thus, we have median lot size data for 38 cities with
populations over one million.
The average number of miles driven per person in individual metropolitan areas was calculated
from the 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey (us Federal Highway Administration,
1995), using the tools to calculate local area statistics described in Reuscher, Schmoyer, and Hu
(2001). The share of employment located more than three miles away from the central business
district in 1996 was kindly provided by Matt Kahn from Glaeser and Kahn (2001).
C. Additional Data for the Determinants of Sprawl
The following paragraphs provide details on data sources and construction for several variables
used in our regressions. All data required to run these regressions is available from http:
//diegopuga.org/data/sprawl/.
Centralized sector employment 1977: For each metropolitan area, we use county business pattern
data for 1977 to calculate the share of employment in each three-digit sic sector i, smsa,i. For
each sector, we know from Glaeser and Kahn (2001) the mean percentage of metropolitan area
employment in that sector that is found within three miles of the central business district, s3,i (see
their paper for details of the calculations). Our measure of centralization of employment is then
calculated as åi smsa,i  s3,i.
Percentage of the urban fringe overlaying aquifers: We use data from us Geological Survey (2003),
originally developed by the usgs to produce the maps printed in the Ground Water Atlas of the
United States (us Geological Survey, 2000). This contains the shallowest principal aquifer at each
point of the United States in a continuous geographical coverage. We exclude shallow sand and
gravel aquifers since their high permeability and shallow depth to the water table makes them
31particularly susceptible to contamination from nitrates and other pollutants whose presence in
sufﬁcient quantity renders water unsuitable for human consumption (Burkart and Stoner, 2002).
Elevation range and Terrain Ruggedness Index in the urban fringe: We assemble the national el-
evation grid by merging 922 separate elevation grids from the 1:250,000-scale Digital Elevation
Models of the usgs, each of which provides 3-arc-second elevation data for an area of one by one
degrees. Let er,c denote elevation at the point located in row r and column c of a grid of elevation





i=c 1(ei,j   er,c)2]1/2. Thevariableusedintheregressionistheaverageterrainruggedness
index of the urban fringe in each metropolitan area.
Mean cooling and heating degree days: Our weather variables are calculated from the climatic
normalsforindividualweatherstations1961–1990containedintheClimateAtlasoftheUnitedStates.
Cooling degrees on a given day are zero if the average temperature is below 65°F (about 18°C)
and the degrees by which the average temperature exceeds 65°F otherwise. Mean annual cooling
degree days are computed by summing cooling degrees over all days in a year. Mean annual
heating degree days are similarly calculated by summing degrees below 65°F over all days in a
year. We computed metropolitan area mean cooling and heating degree days by averaging climatic
normals over all reporting weather stations in each metropolitan area. For the four metropolitan
areas that did not contain a reporting station, we averaged data from weather stations within 30
kilometers of the metropolitan area.
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